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Karl Peterson
70 West 400 North
American Fork, Utah 84003
801-358-6430

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—ooOOO-

American Fork City,
Appellant's Brief

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Appellate Case No. 20081052-CA

Karl G. Peterson,

District Court No. 081100531

Defendant and Appellant.

This is an appeal from a final judgment and order of the Fourth Judicial District,
American Fork Department, Judge Maetani presiding.
Now comes the Appellant and submits this Appellant's Brief as follows:

fCarl Peterson
70 West 400 North
American Fork, Utah 84003
Request that an Opinion be published.
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Appellant's Brief

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Appellate Case No. 20081052-CA
District Court No. 081100531

Karl G. Peterson,
Defendant and Appellant.

This is an appeal from a final judgment and order of the Fourth Judicial District,
American Fork Department, Judge Maetani presiding.
Now comes the Appellant and submits this Appellant's Brief as follows:

Karl Peterson
70 West 400 North
American Fork, Utah 84003
Request that an Opinion be published.
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Statement showing Jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on this Court pursuant to section §78-2a-3(2)(e) of
the Utah Code.
Statement of the Issues
Appellant asserts the following issues on appeal:
Issue 1:
a. The American Fork City Municipal ordinances at Chapter 8.08 Nuisance
Abatement and Beautification Ordinance is unenforceable. It does not comply
with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated §10-9a-515 (l)which trumps or
preempts it.
b. Determinative Law: §UCA 10-9a-515 (1)
c. Standard of Review: de novo. Statutory Interpretation (Sill v Hart, 2005 UT
537 f7), Public Policy Implications (State v Levin, 2006 UT 50ffif20-24, 29 - 31)
Issue 2:
a. The Motion to Set Aside the Judgment should have been granted.
b. Determinative Law: Utah State Constitution, Section 7; Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 16, 5b
c. Standard of Review: de novo. Statutory Interpretation (Sill v Hart, 2005 UT
537 f7), Public Policy Implications (State v Levin, 2006 UT 50ffif20-24, 29 - 31)

6

Determinative Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules
47 C.F.R. Part 97
101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985) PRB-1
Utah Code Annotated §10-9a-515 Regulation of amateur radio antennas.
Utah State Constitution, Section 7
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16
Statement of the Case
a. Nature of the Case
Tfl

Defendant has stored, in his back yard, empty containers which have value to him

and with which he plans to construct an amateur radio tower to support an antenna and
perhaps wind generation rotors for the production of electrical power.(Response, lines
46-48) The back yard is completely surrounded by privacy fencing with no gaps greater
than 2 inches between fence sections and buildings and less than 2 inches below any gate
or fence section. All gates are kept closed and latched. American Fork City brought suit
against the defendant citing violation of 08,080 Nuisance Abatement and Beautification
Ordinance, but chose to shorten the name to 08.080.030 Beautification Ordinance before
the Trial Court when the real title for the section 08.080.030 which they cite is Prohibited
Conduct—Definition of Nuisance.
b. Course of proceedings
1J2

American Fork City brought suit against the defendant for violation of Chapter

7

8.08 Nuisance Abatement and Beautification Ordinance and more specifically 8.08.030
Prohibited conduct —Definition of nuisance. The Pretrial Hearing was aborted due to
defendant filing a Motions for Dismissal. After the defendant had been excused, the
prosecutor chased him down and showed defendant photos that could only have been
taken by entry into the backyard of the property. A request for copies of those photos was
verbally made by the defendant. At a subsequent hearing, the trial judge denied both
Motions for Dismissal. Defendant attempted to file an appeal with the trial court after
that hearing, but the clerk of the court refused to accept it and told defendant that he
would have to wait until after the trial concluded. No further hearings were held prior to
trial. Specifically a complete pretrial hearing was not held. No communications were
had between the City and the defendant prior to the trail. Specifically no photos, witness
lists or other discovery documents were supplied to the defendant. Trial was held in the
absence of the defendant. Defendant was made aware that he had been tried in absentia
when a letter arrived at his residence notifying him that he needed to appear for
Sentencing. This notice arrived the day before the Sentencing Hearing. Prior to the
Sentencing Hearing, defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. At the
Sentencing hearing, defendants Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was denied by the
judge, then sentence and an order were issued. Defendant filed an appeal following
sentencing.

8

c. disposition at trial court
Tf3

Defendant was found guilty of violation of Am. Fork 8.08.030 Beautification

Ordinance, fined $1000 suspended and jail of 180 days suspended, order to clean and
secure a Certificate of Clean Bill of Health from Environmental Quality within 60 days.
Relevant Facts with citation to the record
f4

Defendant filed a Motions for Dismissal with a First Motion for Dismissal and a

Second Motion for Dismissal, (transcript, page 3, lines 14,15) (Motions for Dismissal,
Response to Memorandum in Opposition...)
Trial Judge tells defendant to make arguments for both Motions for Dismissal,
(transcript, page 3, lines 14 - 18)
Defendant made arguments about the enforceability of the ordinance citing trumping
State Law. (transcript, page 5, lines 5-18)
Prosecutor says "I don't even know where he's coming from with that" (transcript, page 6,
lines 12-13)
Trial Judge denies second cause for dismissal, (transcript, page 8 line 1)
Prosecutor interprets the statute for the Judge incorrectly, (transcript, page 6, lines 7-13)
Trial Judge says "Not before this Court" (transcript; page 6, line 16; p8, lines 1-3)
Defendant Filed a Motion To Set Aside The Judgment which was denied. (Trial Court
case notes 12/17/2008, p51)
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Summary of Argument 1
f5

This issue is being tried de novo, so Appellant will attempt to make all arguments

that have been made in pleadings and in oral argument before the Trial Court for the
benefit of the Appeals Court.
Tf6

The Federal Communications Commission(FCC), issued PRB-1 in 1985. Utah

enacted §10-9a-515 in 2005. American Fork City purchased from the West Company,
Inc. a body of statutes for a City. This body of ordinances does not comply with
§10-9a-515 and is thereby rendered unenforceable by §10-9a-515 which tramps or
preempts it. The issue was placed before the court both in pleadings and oral argument.
The Trial court erred in interpreting this statute and the case should have been dismissed
and never gone to trial.
Detail of Argument 1
f7

Appellant holds an FCC Extra Class Amateur Radio licensee, the highest license

class attainable, with call sign WB7PZA and station location at 70 West 400 North,
American Fork, Utah as issued by the FCC. Defendant is also a member of Civil Air
Patrol (CAP) and the Radio Amateur Emergency Service (RACES).
f8

Amateur Radio Operators, commonly referred to as Ham Radio Operators or

Hams, play a critical role in disaster communications. With little or no help from any
level of government, they equip themselves with stations consisting of transceivers
attached to antennas supported by towers or other structures that enable them to have
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worldwide communications capabilities both to send and receive messages in good times
and in times of disaster when there is no power. Many times the first reports out of a
disaster area are from Ham operators in the middle of the disaster who have equipped
their stations with emergency power generation systems and are using makeshift antennas
if their permanent antennas have been damaged. In the event that the signal from the
sending station is weak, a receiving station needs a good antenna system in order to
solidly pass messages to and from the disaster area. The higher above ground an antenna
is, the better it will perform. Due to the danger of airplanes running into tall towers, the
Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter abbreviated as FCC) has regulated
Ham radio antennas and towers for many years.
f9

In recent years, Ham Radio operators who put up antennas and towers, not near

airports, have been the target of harassment from governmental entities using zoning
ordinances, revocation of permits, exorbitant fees, nuisance, health and beautification
ordinances and other tactics. This became such a problem for amateur radio operators in
the 1980fs that the FCC stepped in at the request of the Amateur Radio Relay League
(ARRL), an Amateur Radio national advocacy group. After public comment, the FCC
issued what has come to be known as PRB-1. It is formally cited as Amateur Radio
Preemption, 101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985), and has been codified at 47 C.F.R. Part 97. The
FCC ruled that local governments must grant "reasonable accommodations" to Ham radio
operators in the erection of antennas and their associated towers and other structures and
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also that the regulations needed to be the minimum practicable regulation to accomplish
their legitimate purposes. The reasonableness of the accommodations would be from the
viewpoint of view of the Commission and not that of the local government. PRB-1 gives
any licensed individual who wishes to put up an antenna or tower recourse if he is hassled
in putting it up. This is because the Federal preemption trumps or preempts any state or
local law. In like manner, a state law trumps or preempts any local ordinance.
TflO
levels.

Utah has Statutes which mandate compliance with PRB-1 at the county and local
The State Statute for local governments, which defendant cited to the court,

(transcript, page 5, lines 5-18) is:

§10-9a-515. Regulation of amateur radio antennas.
(1) A municipality may not enact or enforce an ordinance that does not comply with
the ruling of the Federal Communications Commission in "Amateur Radio Preemption,
101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985)" or a regulation related to amateur radio service adopted under
47 C.F.R. Part 97.
(2) If a municipality adopts an ordinance involving the placement, screening, or height
of an amateur radio antenna based on health, safety, or aesthetic conditions, the ordinance
shall:
(a) reasonably accommodate amateur radio communications; and
(b) represent the minimal practicable regulation to accomplish the municipality's

12

purpose.

f 11

The language of this statute makes it effective for all citizens, not just Hams. It

applies even if there is no antenna evident, contemplated or applied for since the verbiage
of the statute does not mention antennas. The Trial court erred in ruling that §10-9a-515
does not apply if there is no antenna, (transcript, page 8, lines 8-10) In section (1), this
statute requires on its face that a ordinance must comply with PRB1 or it may not be
enforced. In section (2) aesthetic conditions are mentioned. The court erred in ruling
that Beautification has nothing to do with antennas (transcript, page 7, lines 3-5) since
aesthetics are in the verbiage of the law.
f 12

The prosecutor misled the Trial Court when he feigned misunderstanding of where

the defendant was coming from. Both the prosecutor and the court had defendants
Response to Memorandum in Opposition... which lays out the argument. (Response to
Memorandum..., lines 35 - 44) By feigning misunderstanding, the prosecutor was
successful in getting the Judge to state that the matter was not before the court when it
had been a central theme in all the pleadings prior to the hearing.
Further discussion of Argument 1
Tf 13

§ 10-9a-515 is an extension of the Federal preemption in PRB-1. The phrase "an

ordinance" could be interpreted broadly or narrowly. If interpreted broadly, the entire
body of the ordinances of a Utah municipality are rendered unenforceable if they do not
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comply with the provisions of PRB-1 as of the date that this Statute was enacted. If
interpreted narrowly, only ordinances such as those enumerated in section (2) and in
PRB-1 would be effected. These would include, but not be limited to, Zoning, Nuisance,
Health, Safety and Beautification. Exactly the ordinances that the defendant is accused
of violating.
^[14

For purposes of this appeal, Appellant chooses to adopt the narrow interpretation.

He does this since he was charged and prosecuted under 8.08 Nuisance Abatement and
Beautification Ordinance, Antennas and towers have been declared nuisances or eyesores in many localities and so are clearly covered under PRB-1. American City
Ordinance 08.080 does not comply with PRB-1 and therefore cannot be enforced. The
trial court erred in denying defendant's second Cause for Diamissal in his Motions for
Dismissal, (transcript, page 8 line 1)
^[15

Next comes a question of what would it mean to comply or how an ordinance

could comply. The word "comply" is not found in Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth
Edition. If we look to (2) of §10-9a-515 we can see what compliance might look like. It
enumerates two conditions which must be addressed before an ordinance can be enacted
and enforced. They are reasonable accommodations and minimal practicable regulation
towards Amateur Radio Communications.
\ 16

8.08. Nuisance Abatement and Beautification Ordinance meets the narrow test as

being the type of ordinance that could affect amateur radio communications under the

14

second paragraph of §10-9a-515 and so it must comply with PRB-1 if it is to be enforced.
There is nothing about reasonable accommodations or minimal practicable regulation to
be found in the ordinance. In like manner, Appellant asserts that every other other
ordinance of American Fork City will be found lacking. Appellant asks the Appeals court
to clarify the standards by which §10-9a-515 is to be applied to the ordinances of a
municipality, and also to those of a county, so that a clear public policy can be defined.
^[17

The West Company Inc. sold this package of municipal ordinances to cities

throughout the State of Utah. There are probably other municipalities that will have their
ordinances rendered unenforceable because of §10-9a-515. This constitutes a major
public policy issue. If the ordinances of American Fork became unenforceable as of the
2005 enactment date of §10-9a-515, there are going to be a lot of traffic citations that will
have to be vacated and refunded. For that reason, Appellant asks that the opinion of the
Appeals Court be published so that any city with nonconforming ordinances may be
properly notified.
Summary of Argument 2
If 18

Due to the lack of a proper Pretrial Hearing and the failure of the Prosecutor to

provide defendant with required discovery documents prior to trial, the defendant's right
to due process was denied.
Detail of Argument 2
f 19

The Pretrial Hearing shown on the Trial Court case notes was truncated by the

15

Judge when the defendant said he had filed Motions for Dismissal. During the Motions
for Dismissal Hearing, the Judge did not give the defendant any opportunity to ask for a
pretrial hearing and set the matter for a hearing after having told the defendant to sit
down and wait a minute, (transcript, page 8, line 6 and 13). This effectively made the
conversation between the Judge and Prosecutor a private conversation. Defendant
expected to receive witness lists and other requested documentation well before a Trail as
required of the Prosecution in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No disclosures of any
kind were made to the defense other than through the Information at arraignment. The
complaining officer did not testify, but some other official did. There is also mention of
an Elizabeth Batty of whom the defendant has no knowledge, especially knowledge that
should have come to him from the prosecution on a List of Possible Witnesses. None of
the required discovery materials or information were disclosed to the defendant prior to
the trail, even though Rule 16 in section 5b says that all information will be made
available before a defendant is required to plead, and that it is then a continuing duty.
The Prosecution failed in this continuing duty. This lack of due process caused the
defendant to let the matter slip from his mind and miss the hearing. The Court should
have granted defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment when this breach of the Rules
of Procedure was brought to his attention in the Motion, and should have set the matter
for Pretrial Conference or a new trial.
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Conclusion
^f20

Appellant has had his privacy invaded under color of law, been denied due

process, had motions denied that should have been granted if the law had been applied
correctly, been prosecuted and convicted under ordinances that are unenforceable by the
letter of trumping State law. The trial court erred by not dismissing the case when
presented with that law and hearing arguments relevant to it. The trial court also erred by
not granting defendant's Motion to Set Aside The Judgment when it was presented to the
court.
Relief Sought
f 21

Appellant asks the Appeals Court to vacate the judgment and order, rule that

American Fork City's 8.08.030 Nuisance Abatement and Beautification Ordinance
ordinance is unenforceable, rule that all other ordinances that could be used to affect his
ability to construct a tower from the raw materials in his backyard are unenforceable. He
asks the Appeals Court to Dismiss with prejudice the case against him. Appellant asks
for an order that American Fork City be barred from charging or prosecuting him under
any effected ordinance once it is brought into compliance with PRB-1, but rather
grandfather his uses of the property and materials stored on his property under the new
ordinances. Appellant asks that the Appeals Court put forth a standard for interpretation
for application to §10-9a-515 and §17-27a-514. He also asks the Appeals Court to
censure the Prosecuting Attorney for his lack of providing required documents to

17

defendant prior to trial. Appellant asks for any other relief that the Court of Appeals
might see fit to grant him.

Signature,
Filed with the Court of Appeals, 10/9/09

Karl Peterson

/O/'f/o

f
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Certificate of Service
I certify that a copy of this Appellants Brief document was served upon the following
party listed below by the method indicated:

American Fork City and Appellee's Counsel
by placement in the box at the courthouse set aside for the purpose of service

Karl Peterson

Dated:

tP/^/ZOOf
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Addendum
a. PRB-1
b. Utah State Law City §10-9a-515
c. Utah State Law County §17-27a-514
d. Sill v Hart
e. State v Levin
f. Motions for Dismissal.
g. Response to Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss,
h. Motion to Set Aside The Judgment
i. American Fork Ordinance 8.08
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Memorandum Opinion and Order in PRB-1
Memorandum Opinion and Order in PRB-1
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, DC 20554

FCC 85-506
36149

In the Matter of
Federal preemption of state and
local regulations pertaining
to Amateur radio facilities.

PRB-1

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Adopted: September 16, 1985
By the Commission:

/Released: September 19, 1985

Commissioner Rivera not participating.

Background
1. On July 16, 1984, the American Radio Relay League, Inc
(ARRL) filed a Request for Issuance of a Declaratory Ruling
asking us to delineate the limitations of local zoning and other
local and state regulatory authority over Federally-licensed
radio facilities. Specifically, the ARRL wanted an explicit
statement that would preempt all local ordinances which provably
preclude or significantly inhibit effective reliable amateur
radio communications. The ARRL acknowledges that local
authorities can regulate amateur installations to insure the
safety and health of persons in the community, but believes that
those regulations cannot be so restrictive that they preclude
effective amateur communications.
2. Interested parties were advised that they could file
comments in the matter.\fn 1/ With extension, comments were due
on or before December 26, 1984,\fn 2/ with reply comments due on
or before January 25, 1985 \fn 3/ Over sixteen hundred comments
were filed.
Local Ordinances
3. Conflicts between amateur operators regarding radio
antennas and local authorities regarding restrictive ordinances
are common. The amateur operator is governed by the regulations
contained in Part 97 of our rules. Those rules do not limit the
height of an amateur antenna but they require, for aviation
safety reasons, that certain FAA notification and FCC approval
procedures must be followed for antennas which exceed 200 feet in
height above ground level or antennas which are to be erected
near airports. Thus, under FCC rules some antenna support
structures require obstruction marking and lighting. On the
other hand, local municipalities or governing bodies frequently
enact regulations limiting antennas and their support structures
in height and location, e.g. to side or rear yards, for health,
safety or aesthetic considerations. These limiting regulations
can result in conflict because the effectiveness of the
communications that emanate from an amateur radio station are
directly dependent upon the location and the height of the
antenna. Amateur operators maintain that they are precluded from
operating in certain bands allocated for their use if the height
of their antennas is limited by a local ordinance.
4. Examples of restrictive local ordinances were submitted by
several amateur operators in this proceeding. Stanley J. Cichy,
San Diego, California, noted that in San Diego amateur radio

antennas come under a structures ruling which limits building
heights to 30 feet. Thus, antennas there are also limited to 30
feet. Alexander Vrenios, Mundelein, Illinois wrote that an
ordinance or the Village of Mundelein provides that an antenna
must be a distance from the property line that is equal to one
and one-half times its height. In his case, he is limited to an
antenna tower for his amateur station just over 53 feet in
height.
5. John C. Chapman, an amateur living in Bloomington,
Minnesota, commented that he was not able to obtain a building
permit to install an amateur radio antenna exceeding 35 feet in
height because the Bloomington city ordinance restricted
"structures" heights to 35 feet. Mr. Chapman said that the
ordinance, when written, undoubtedly applied,to buildings but was
now being applied to antennas in the absence of a specific
ordinance regulating them. There were two options open to him if
he wanted to engage in amateur communications. He could request
a variance to the ordinance by way of hearing before the City
Council, or he could obtain affidavits from his neighbors
swearing that they had no objection to the proposed antenna
installation. He got the building permit after obtaining the
cooperation of his neighbors. His concern, however, is that he
had to get permission from several people before he could
effectively engage radio communications for which he had a valid
FCC amateur license.
6. In addition to height restrictions, other limits are
enacted by local jurisdictions--anti-climb devices on towers or
fences around them; minimum distances from high voltage power
lines; minimum distances of towers from property lines; and
regulations pertaining to the structural soundness of the antenna
installation. By and large, amateurs do not find these safety
precautions objectionable. What they do object to are the
sometimes prohibitive, non-refundable application filing fees to
obtain a permit to erect an antenna installation and those
provisions in ordinances which regulate antennas for purely
aesthetic reasons. The amateurs contend, almost universally,
that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." They assert that an
antenna installation is not more aesthetically displeasing than
other objects that people keep on their property, e.g. motor
homes, trailers, pick-up trucks, solar collectors and gardening
equipment.
Restrictive Covenants
7. Amateur operators also oppose restrictions on their
amateur operations which are contained in the deeds for their
homes or in their apartment leases. Since these restrictive
covenants are contractual agreements between private parties,
they are not generally a matter of concern to the Commission.
However, since some amateurs who commented in this proceeding
provided us with examples of restrictive covenants, they are
included for information Mr. Eugene 0. Thomas of Hollister,
California included in his comments an extract of the Declaration
of Covenants and Restrictions for Ridgemark Estates, County of
San Benito, State of California. It provides:
No antenna for transmission or reception of radio signals
shall be erected outdoors for use by any dwelling unit except
upon approval of the Directors. No radio or television
signals or any other form of electromagnetic radiation shall
be permitted to originate from any lot which may unreasonably
interfere with the reception of television or radio signals
upon any other lot.
Marshall Wilson, Jr. provided a copy of the restrictive covenant
contained in deeds for the Bell Martin Addition #2, Irving,
Texas. It is binding upon all of the owners or purchasers of the

lots in the said addition, his or their heirs, executors,
administrators or assigns. It reads:
No antenna or tower shall be erected upon any lot for the
purposes of radio operations.
William J. Hamilton resides in an"apartment building in
Gladstone, Missouri. He cites a clause in his lease prohibiting
the erection of an antenna. He states that he has been forced to
give up operation amateur radio equipment except a hand-held 2
meter (144-148 MHz) radio transceiver. He maintains that he
should not be penalized just because he lives in an apartment.
Other restrictive covenants are less global in scope than
those cited above. For example, Robert Webb purchased a home in
Houston, Texas. His deed restriction prohibited "transmitting or
receiving antennas extending above the roof line."
8. Amateur operators generally oppose restrictive covenants
for several reasons. They maintain that such restrictions limit
the places that they can reside if they want to pursue their
hobby of amateur radio. Some state that they impinge on First
Amendment rights of speech. Others believe that a constitutional
right is being abridged because, in their view, everyone has a
right to access the airwaves regardless of where they live.
9. The contrary belief held by housing subdivision
communities and condominium or homeowner's associations is that
amateur radio installations constitute safety hazards, cause
interference to other electronic equipment which may be operated
in the home (television, radio, stereos) or are eyesores that
detract from the aesthetic and tasteful appearance of the housing
development or apartment complex. To counteract these negative
consequences, the subdivisions and associations include in their
deeds, leases or by-laws, restrictions and limitations on the
location and height of antennas or, in some cases, prohibit them
altogether. The restrictive covenants are contained in the
contractual agreement entered into at the time of the sale or
lease of the property. Purchasers or lessees are free to choose
whether they wish to reside where such restrictions on amateur
antennas are in effect or settle elsewhere.
Supporting Comments
10. The Department of Defense (DOD) supported the ARRL and
emphasized in its comments that continued success of existing
national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications
plans involving amateur stations would be severely diminished if
state and local ordinances were allowed to prohibit the
construction and usage of effective amateur transmission
facilities. DOD utilizes volunteers in the Military Affiliate
Radio Service (MARS), \fn 4/ Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and the Radio
Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES). It points out that
these volunteer communicators are operating radio equipment
installed in their homes and that undue restrictions on antennas
by local authorities adversely affect their efforts. DOD states
that the responsiveness of these volunteer systems would be
impaired if local ordinances interfere with the effectiveness of
these important national telecommunication resources. DOD favors
the issuance of a ruling that would set limits for local and
state regulatory bodies when they are dealing with amateur
stations.
11. Various chapters of the American Red Cross also came.
forward to support the ARRL's request for a preemptive ruling.
The Red Cross works closely with amateur radio volunteers. It
believes that without amateurs' dedicated support, disaster
relief operations would significantly suffer and that its ability
to serve disaster victims would be hampered. It feels that
antenna height limitations that might be imposed by local bodies
will negatively affect the service now rendered by the

volunteers.
12. Cities and counties from various parts of the United
States filed comments in support of the ARRL's request for a
Federal preemption ruling. The comments from the Director of
Civil Defense, Port Arthur, Texas are representative:
The Amateur Radio Service plays a vital role with our Civil
Defense program here in Port Arthur and the design of these
antennas and towers lends greatly to our ability to
communicate during times of disaster. We do not believe
there should be any restrictions on the antennas and towers
except for reasonable safety precautions. Tropical storms,
hurricanes and tornadoes are a way of life here on the Texas
Gulf Coast and good communications are absolutely essential
when preparing for a hurricane and even more so during
recovery operations after the hurricane has past.
13. The Quarter Century Wireless Association took a strong
stand in favor of the Issuance of a declaratory ruling. It
believes that Federal preemption is necessary so that there will
be uniformity for all Amateur Radio installations on private
property throughout the United States.
14. In its comments, the ARRL argued that the Commission has
the jurisdiction to preempt certain local land use regulations
which frustrate or prohibit amateur radio communications. It
said that the appropriate standard in preemption cases is not the
extent of state and local interest in a given regulation, but
rather the impact of the regulation on Federal goals. Its
position is that Federal preemption is warranted whenever local
government regulations relate adversely to the operational
aspects of amateur communication. The ARRL maintains that
localities routinely employ a variety of land use devices to
preclude the installation of effective amateur antennas,
including height restrictions, conditional use permits, building
setbacks and dimensional limitations on antennas. It sees a
declaratory ruling of Federal preemption as necessary to cause
municipalities to accommodate amateur operator needs in land use
planning efforts.
15. James C. O'Connell, an attorney who has represented
several amateurs before local zoning authorities, said that
requiring amateurs to seek variances or special use approval to
erect reasonable antennas unduly restricts the operation of
amateur stations. He suggested that the Commission preempt
zoning ordinances which impose antenna height limits of less than
65 feet. He said that this height would represent a reasonable
accommodation of the communication needs of most amateurs and the
legitimate concerns of local zoning authorities.
Opposing Comments
16. The City of La Mesa, California has a zoning regulation
which controls amateur antennas. Its comments reflected an
attempt to reach a balanced view.
This regulation has neither the intent, nor the effect, of
precluding or inhibiting effective and reliable communications.
Such antennas may be built as long as their construction does not
unreasonably block views or constitute eyesores. The reasonable
assumption is that there are always alternatives at a given site
for different placement, and/or methods for aesthetic treatment.
Thus, both public objectives of controlling land use for the
public health, safety, and convenience, and providing an
effective communications network, can be satisfied. A blanket to
completely set aside local control, or a ruling which recognizes
control only for the purpose of safety of antenna construction,
would be contrary to...legitimate local control.

17. Comments from the County of San Diego state:
While we are aware of the benefits provided by amateur operators,
we oppose the issuance of a preemption ruling which would elevate
"antenna effectiveness' to a position above all other
considerations. We must, however, argue that the local
government must have the ability to place reasonable limitations
upon the placement and configuration of amateur radio
transmitting and receiving antennas. Such ability is necessary
to assure that the local decision-makers have the authority to
protect the public health, safety and welfare of all citizens.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize an important
difference between your regulatory powers and that of local
governments. Your Commission's approval of the preemptive
requests would establish a "national policy." However, any
regulation adopted by a local jurisdiction could be overturned by
your Commission or a court if such regulation was determined to
be unreasonable.
18. The City of Anderson, Indiana, summarized some of the
problems that face local communities:
I am sympathetic to the concerns of these antenna owners and I
understand that to gain the maximum reception from their devices,
optimal location is necessary. However, the preservation of
residential zoning districts as "liveable" neighborhoods is
jeopardized by placing these antennas in front yards of homes.
Major problems of public safety have been encountered,
particularly vision blockage for auto and pedestrian access. In
addition, all communities are faced with various building lot
sizes. Many building lots are so small that established setback
requirements (in order to preserve adequate air and light) are
vulnerable to the unregulated placement of antennas.
...the exercise of preemptive authority by the FCC in
granting this request would not be in the best interest of the
general public.
19. The National Association of Counties (NACO), the American
Planning Association (APA) and the National League of Cities
(NCL) all opposed the issuance of an antenna preemption ruling.
NACO emphasized that federal and state power must be viewed in
harmony and warns that Federal intrusion into local concerns of
health, safety and welfare could weaken the traditional police
power exercised by the state and unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the states. NLC believed that both
Federal and local interests can be accommodated without
preempting local authority to regulate the installation of
amateur radio antennas. The APA said that the FCC should
continue to leave the issue of regulating amateur antennas with
the local government and with the state and Federal courts.
Discussion
20. When considering preemption, we must begin with two
constitutional provisions. The tenth amendment provides that any
powers which the constitution either does not delegate to the
United States or does not prohibit the states from exercising are
reserved to the states. These are the police powers of the
states. The Supremacy Clause, however, provides that the
constitution and the laws of the United States shall supersede
any state law to the contrary. Article III, Section 2. Given
these basic premises, state laws may be preempted in three ways:
First, Congress may expressly preempt the state law. See Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Or, Congress may
indicate its intent to completely occupy a given field so that
any state law encompassed within that field would implicitly be
preempted. Such intent to preempt could be found in a

congressional regulatory scheme that was so pervasive that it
would be reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to
permit the states to supplement it. See Fidelity Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). Finally,
preemption may be warranted when state law conflicts with federal
law. Such conflicts may occur when "compliance with both Federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 143 (1963),
or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Furthermore,
federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal
statues, Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la
Cuesta, supra.
21. The situation before us requires us to determine the
extent to which state and local zoning regulations may conflict
with federal policies concerning amateur radio operators.
22. Few matters coming before us present such a clear
dichotomy of view point as does the instant issue. The cities,
countries, local communities and housing associations see an
obligation to all of their citizens and try to address their
concerns. This is accomplished through regulations, ordinances
or covenants oriented toward the health, safety and general
welfare of those they regulate. At the opposite pole are the
individual amateur operators and their support groups who are
troubled by local regulations which may inhibit the use of
amateur stations or, in some instances, totally preclude amateur
communications. Aligned with the operators are such entities as
the Department of Defense, the American Red Cross and local civil
defense and emergency organizations who have found in Amateur
Radio a pool of skilled radio operators and a readily available
backup network. In this situation, we believe it is appropriate
to strike a balance between the federal interest in promoting
amateur operations and the legitimate interests of local
governments in regulating local zoning matters. The cornerstone
on which we will predicate our decision is that a reasonable
accommodation may be made between the two sides.
23. Preemption is primarily a function of the extent of the
conflict between federal and state and local regulation. Thus,
in considering whether our regulations or policies can tolerate a
state regulation, we may consider such factors as the severity of
the conflict and the reasons underlying the state's regulations.
In this regard, we have previously recognized the legitimate and
important state interests reflected in local zoning regulations.
For example, in Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 FCC 2d
1223 (1983), we recognized that
...countervailing state interests inhere in the present
situation...For example, we do not wish to preclude a state or
locality from exercising jurisdiction over certain elements of an
SMATV operation that properly may fall within its authority, such
as zoning or public safety and health, provided the regulation in
question is not undertaken as a pretext for the actual purpose of
frustrating achievement of the preeminent federal objective and
so long as the non-federal regulation is applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner.
24. Similarly, we recognize here that there are certain
general state and local interests which may, in their even-handed
application, legitimately affect amateur radio facilities.
Nonetheless, there is also a strong federal interest in promoting
amateur communications. Evidence of this interest may be found
in the comprehensive set of rules that the Commission has adopted
to regulate the amateur service. \fn 5/ Those rules set forth
procedures for the licensing of stations and operators, frequency
allocations, technical standards which amateur radio equipment
must meet and operating practices which amateur operators must

follow. We recognize the amateur radio service as a voluntary,
noncommercial communication service, particularly with respect to
providing emergency communications. Moreover, the amateur radio
service provides a reservoir of trained operators, technicians
and electronic experts who can be called on in times of national
or local emergencies. By its nature, the Amateur Radio Service
also provides the opportunity for individual operators to further
international goodwill. Upon weighing these interests, we
believe a limited preemption policy is warranted. State and
local regulations that operate to preclude amateur communications
in their communities are in direct conflict with federal
objectives and must be preempted.
25. Because amateur station communications are only as
effective as the antennas employed, antenna height restrictions
directly affect the effectiveness of amateur communications.
Some amateur antenna configurations require more substantial
installations than others if they are to provide the amateur
operator with the communications that he/she desires to engage
in. For example, an antenna array for international amateur
communications will differ from an antenna used to contact other
amateur operators at shorter distances. We will not, however,
specify any particular height limitation below which a local
government may not regulate, nor will we suggest the precise
language that must be contained in local ordinances, such as
mechanisms for special exceptions, variances, or conditional use
permits. Nevertheless, local regulations which involve
placement, screening, or height of antennas based on health,
safety, or aesthetic considerations must be crafted to
accommodate reasonably amateur communications, and to represent
the minimum practicable regulation to accomplish the local
authority's legitimate purpose. \fn 6/
26. Obviously, we do not have the staff or financial
resources to review all state and local laws that affect amateur
operations. We are confident, however, that state and local
governments will endeavor to legislate in a manner that affords
appropriate recognition to the important federal interest at
stake here and thereby avoid unnecessary conflicts with federal
policy, as well as time-consuming and expensive litigation in
this area. Amateur operators who believe that local or state
governments have been overreaching and thereby have precluded
accomplishment of their legitimate communications goals, may, in
addition, use this document to bring our policies to the
attention of local tribunals and forums.
27. Accordingly, the Request for Declaratory Ruling filed
July 16, 1984, by the American Radio Relay League, Inc., IS
GRANTED to the extent indicated herein and in all other respects,
IS DENIED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
William J. Tricarico
Secretary
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DAVIS, Judge:
fl
Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Joel Sill appeals from a
final judgment and award of prejudgment interest, attorney fees,
and court costs in favor of Defendant-counterclaimant Bill Hart.
We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
i|2
Sill is the owner of real property loca ted in Summit County,
Utah (the Property). Hart, a general contra ctor, began
construction on the Property in the summer o f 1999 and continued
until approximately December 2001, at which time Hart left the
job over a dispute with Sill regarding the c ompletion of the
project. In January 2 0 02, Sill brought an action against Hart,
alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of f iduciary duty, (4)
negligent misrepresentation, (5) intentional misrepresentation,
(6) unjust enrichment, and (7) defamation
Hart counterclaimed
in February 2002, alleging breach of contrac t and unjust

1-11(4)(a) does not apply to his claim because he filed a
counterclaim as opposed to a "complaint" and because Sill has no
rights under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery
Fund Act. Sill, on the other hand, argues not only that section
38-1-11 (4) (a) is applicable, but also that the language of
section 38-1-11(4) (e) makes subsection 4(a) a jurisdictional
provision. Sill therefore contends that Hart's failure to comply
with section 38-1-11(4) (a) deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to hear Hart's lien foreclosure action.
1(7
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law
that are reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the
district court's interpretation." Board of Educ. v. Sandy City
Corp. , 2004 UT 37,1(8, 94 P. 3d 234. "The determination of whether
a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law,
which we review for correctness, according no deference to the
[trial] court's determination." Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc.,
2001 UT 81,1(8, 31 P.3d 1147.
ANALYSIS
f8
Prior to addressing Sill's jurisdictional claim, we first
determine whether section 38-1-11(4)(a) is even applicable in
this case. The language at issue here states:
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce
a lien filed under [the Mechanics' Liens Act]
involving a residence, as defined in
[s]ection 38-11-102, [2] the lien claimant
shall include with the service of the
complaint on the owner of the residence:
(i) instructions to the owner of the
residence relating to the owner's rights
under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for
summary judgment to enable the owner of the
residence to specify the grounds upon which
the owner may exercise available rights under
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act.
2

Under Utah Code section 38-11-102, a "residence" is defined
as "an improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used
or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary
detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two
units, including factory built housing." Utah Code Ann. § 38-11102 (20) (2001) .
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DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION

Hi
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects against self-incrimination.1 To preserve this right,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that defendants subjected to
custodial interrogation are entitled to a Miranda warning.2
Where such a warning is not given, any incriminating statements
made by a defendant during the custodial interrogation are
excluded from evidence.3 We granted certiorari in this case to

1

U.S. Const, amend V.

2

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 300-01 (1980);
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45; Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d
(continued...)

for determining an issue."14 Standards of review should allocate
discretion between the trial and appellate courts in a way that
takes account of the "relative capabilities of each level of the
court system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the
face of conflicting evidence, on one hand, and to set binding
jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other."15 These considerations
are critical in selecting a standard of review from along a
spectrum of deference that runs from highly deferential review
under a "clearly erroneous" standard on one end to completely
nondeferential review under a "correctness" standard on the other
end.16
^[20 Because a trial court is in a better position to
judg[e] credibility and resolv[e] evidentiary conflicts," an
appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for
clear error.17 Conversely, an appellate court reviews a trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness because u a single
trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what the
legal content of [a legal concept] should be [whereas] a panel of
appellate judges, with their collective experience and their
broader perspective, is better suited to that task."18
Additionally, the published decisions of appellate courts
xx
provid[e] state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and
prosecutorial officials."19
xx

i|21 The analytical complexity of our standard of review is
at its height when we review a trial court's application of a
legal concept to a given set of facts. When we review so-called

State v. Thurman, 869 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Utah 1993) .
Id. at 1266.
16

.See Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("[0]ne can
visualize the traditional standard-of-review scheme as a
continuum of deference anchored at either end by the clearly
erroneous and correction-of-error standards, which correspond
with whether the issue is characterized as one of fact or of
law.").
17

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.

18

Id.; accord Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 ("[A]ppellate courts
have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say
what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the
jurisdiction.").
19

Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.
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"mixed questions of fact ^nd law," the considerations that favor
a more-deferential standard of review and those that favor a
less-deferential standard of review compete for dominance, and
the amount of deference that results will vary according to the
nature of the legal concept at issue. Mixed questions of fact
and law involving different legal issues will often require
different standards of review.20
\12
While we have said that, ultimately, "the legal effect
of [the] facts is the province of the appellate courts,"21 our
prior decisions recognize that, with regard to many mixed
questions of fact and law, it is either not possible or not wise
for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is
to be applied to each new set of facts.22 Where the correct
application of a legal concept is difficult to explain using a
generally applicable standard, overinvolvement by an appellate
court can lead to confusing and inconsistent pronouncements of
the law.23 We have recognized that the application of such a
legal concept incorporates a de facto grant of discretion to the
trial court, and, accordingly, we review the trial court's
decision on the mixed question of fact and law with deference
commensurate to that discretion.24
1(23 But with regard to certain mixed questions where
uniform application is of high importance, as in the context of
Fourth Amendment protections, we have held that policy
considerations dictate that the application of the legal concept
should be strictly controlled by the appellate courts.25 Thus,

20

See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; see also Searle v. Milburn
Irrig. Co., 2006 UT 16, \ 16, 133 P.3d 382 ("The measure of
discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being
reviewed." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21

Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
22

See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-40.

23

Id. at 940.

24

Id. at 937-39; State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 27, 137
P.3d 787.
25

See Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ \ 14-15; see also State v.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (stating that there must
be "statewide standards that guide law enforcement and
(continued...)
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considerations in our decision in Brake37 and treated policy
considerations as a "fourth" Pena factor in State v. Virgin.38
Thus, to clarify the appropriate test, we have rephrased the
factors here in a manner that better reflects their usefulness in
selecting a standard of review from somewhere along the spectrum
of deference.
129 In the process of rephrasing the test, we have dropped
the "novelty" factor because it has rarely, if ever, proven to be
helpful to our analysis. As it was phrased in Pena, the novelty
factor considered whether "the situation to which the legal
principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that
appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate
definitively what factors should be outcome determinative."39
The situations in which this factor required more deferential
review were unclear. Our cases demonstrate that legal issues
involving situations that are completely new to the appellate
courts are rare. Furthermore, where a situation is novel, it is
not self-evident that the appellate courts should restrain
themselves from exercising searching review and should instead
take a wait-and-see approach to establishing a legal test. In
the language of the pasture metaphor, we are not convinced that
we should necessarily refrain from establishing fences that
restrain trial courts simply because a situation is novel and
anticipating the future development of the law may be difficult.

1(3 0 Furthermore, because this "novelty" factor was
prominent in the original Pena test despite its rare
applicability, it has often proven unwieldy, cluttered the
analysis, or been ignored. For example, we have sometimes stated
that the situation presented was not "new," but then have
addressed whether we could articulate "outcome determinative
factors."40 The later inquiry is substantially the same as the

37

2004 UT 95, HH 14-15.

38

2006 UT 29, 1 28.

39

869 P.2d at 939.

40

See Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, U 17, 133
P.3d 3 82 (concluding that "at least some deference should be
granted to the district court's application of the law to the
facts" where it was "exceedingly difficult to craft a uniform
rule neatly applicable in all situations"); Butler, Crockett &
Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating, 2004 UT 67,
(continued...)
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inquiry that we make under the first factor, namely: the degree
to which the variety and complexity of the facts make it
difficult to articulate a legal test or factors that are outcome
determinative. Such mixing of the separate analytical inquiries
from the first and second original Pena factors has only served
to confuse the analysis and may have led appellate courts to
place too much weight on the difficulty of articulating a rule.
Ultimately, in the rare instances where this "novelty of the
situation" factor may be important, it could fall under the
umbrella of other policy considerations.
f31 In making these changes to the way that we articulate
the established standard, our intent is to improve upon our
statement of the test that we apply to mixed questions of fact
and law without changing its core substance. As before, our goal
in applying the above balancing test is to allocate tasks between
the trial and appellate courts based on their institutional roles
and competencies.
II. WHETHER A DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION IS A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW THAT
WE REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS.
i)32 Having set forth the balancing test to be used in
selecting an appropriate standard of review for a mixed question
of fact and law, we now apply the test to answer the question at
hand; namely, what is the standard appellate courts apply in
reviewing a trial court's determination that a person was or was
not subjected to custodial interrogation for the purpose of Fifth
Amendment Miranda protections? To do so, we will first outline
the legal concept of custodial interrogation in the context of
our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. We will then apply the threefactor balancing test to the mixed question of custodial
interrogation, discussing each of the three factors in turn.

40

( . . . continued)
% 47, 98 P.3d 1 (concluding that the second factor supported
additional deference to a trial court's beneficial use
determination, even though the beneficial use doctrine "has roots
dating back to the turn of the last century"); Jeffs v. Stubbs,
970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998) (concluding that although "the
unjust enrichment doctrine has ancient roots," the second factor
supported a "broad degree of discretion in applying the law"
where "the court's ability to state clearly the outcomedeterminative factors remains elusive").
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Karl G. Peterson
70 West 400 North
American Fork, Utah 84003
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

)
1 Motions for Dismissal
)
I Case No. 081100531

VS.

;

KARL G. PETERSON
70 West 400 North
American Fork, UT 84003

]) Judge Howard H. Maetani
]
]

DOB: 07-26-59

]

Defendant

]

COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT and MOVES FOR DISMISSAL of the Charges against him based
on any of the the following:
First Motion for Dismissal.
1. 1. American Fork City Ordinances, Section 8.08.040 appoints Walt Farmer as the city inspector
2.
3. for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the chapter.
2, 2. The INFORMATION gives the witness as Darren Falslev.
2. 3. Since a specific individual is identified as the only person who can make a determination under
3.
4. the chapter, an action can only be sustained upon the testimony of that specific individual.
The INFORMATION not being based upon the proper witness, Defendant moves for Dismissal with
prejudice.

i

Second Motion for Dismissal
4

Defendant is licensed as an Amateur Radio Operator.

5.
5.

Many municipalities have used Nuisance Abatement and Beautification ordinances to limit the
6. activities of Amateur Radio Operators.

6,

These actions resulted in the issuance of PRB-1 by the Federal Communications Commission
6. and cited as "Amateur Radio Preemption. 101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985)"

7

PRB-1 required reasonable accommodations starting in 1985.

8.

Chapter 8.08 was enacted in 4/90 and makes no mention of amateur radio or reasonable
8.
9. accommodations.

c9.

The State of Utah enacted UCA 10-9a-515 in 2005 stating that an ordinance that does not
9. comply with PRB-1 may not be enforced.

10.

An action on an unenforceable statute cannot be sustained.

Defendant asks the Court to rule that Chapter 8.08 is trumped by State Law, rendered unenforceable,
and that this action be dismissed.

Karl G. Peterson
70 West 400 North
American Fork, Utah 84003
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

]
1 Response to
]1
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
)
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DSIMISS

vs.

]) Case No. 081100531

KARL G.PETERSON
70 West 400 North
American Fork, UT 84003

]) Judge Howard H. Maetani

Defendant

]

Comes now the Defendant and responds to the Plaintiffs answer to Defendants Motion to Dismiss as
follows:
In Re: FACTS:

I. Each of the Plaintiffs first four bullets alleges things that have not been entered
2.
3. into evidence, are not subject to cross-examination, are gross hyperbole,
4.
5. or are immaterial to the motion at hand.
6.
7. The fifth bullet merely restates the charge, is redundant and is immaterial to the motion before
8.
9. the court.
10.
II. As Plaintiff teaches us, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 10(h) allows the court to
12.
13. disregard redundant and immaterial matter.
14.
15. Defendant asks the court to strike and disregard bullets 1 through 5.

In Re: Section I Argument:
4. In the first paragraph, Plaintiff makes reference to the 8.08 "Nuisance Abatement and
5.
6. Beautification" ordinance of American Fork City.
7.
8. Plaintiff has not enclosed a copy of that ordinance for the benefit of the court or the defendant..
9.
10. Defendant now does so as an attachment to this pleading.
11.
12. These photocopies were obtained at American Fork Public Library from a binder in the second
13.
14. floor locked records room; access information: Hist, 349.792, Ame.
15.
16. Defendant took a copy of that section to the American Fork City offices prior to drafting his
17.
18. Motion to Dismiss and asked the Assistant Recorder to compare it to the book in their
vault.
19.
20. She said it was the same.
21.
22. Defendant is left to wonder just where the Plaintiff is quoting from, as the Ordinances
23.
24. available to the public at the American Fork Public Library, and those in the vault at
25.
26. City Hall do not contain the 8.08.40 language that Plaintiff purports to quote.
27.
28. It is a fundamental principle of our system that laws are public documents and that
29.
30. defendants have access to the law.
31.
32. As an example, the State of Utah maintains a website, in addition to the one that WestLaw
33.
34. maintains, that anyone with an internet connection can access.
35.
36. If the Ordinances of American Fork are not available for public access, but only available to
37.
38. the prosecutor, a fundamental tenet of our system is violated.
39.
40. The Ordinances which are available for public access must be used.
41.
42. If American Fork wishes to enforce a different law, then American Fork should maintain,
43.
44. at a minimum, the book in the American Fork Public Library.
45.
46. To allow books purporting to be the ordinances of American Fork to exist in the
47.
48. American Fork Public Library, and the Harold B. Lee Law Library, without something to

49.
50. direct a citizen to where the law "in reality" may be found is something that this court
51.
52. should not tolerate.
53.
54. Maintaining the book in the Harold B. Lee Law Library would be a good practice.
55.
56. Maintaining a website, similar to that of the State of Utah would be a good practice.
57.
58. Having the only up-to-date an valid copy of the Ordinances of American Fork solely in
59.
60. the hands of the Prosecutor, if that is what he quotes from, is not good public policy.
61.
62. This court should not allow such conduct.
63.
64. Defendant asks the court to rule that the law that should govern is that which is
65.
66. publicly viewable in the American Fork City Library.
67.
68. Defendant again moves that this case be dismissed with prejudice.
69.
70. The last paragraph represents an interesting way to slip in another witness and bolster
71.
72. the "Facts" introduced earlier.
73.
74. The added name is still not Walt Farmer.
In Re: Section II:
25. Plaintiff appears to misunderstand or misinterpret PRB-1.
26.
27. PRB-1 addresses the radio towers and radio antennas of Amateur Radio Operators.
28.
29. PRB-1 indicates that many municipalities have tried to regulate towers which may be
30.
31. many feet above the ground and well above the surrounding houses and fences
32.
33. via nuisance and beautification ordinances such as this one.
34.
35. PRB-1 states that since the FCC regulates Amateur Radio towers and antennas, that
36.
37. local authorities may not, but must reasonably accommodate them..
38.
39. UCA 10-9a-515 requires local Ordinances to address PRB-1 or be unenforceable.
40.
41. The Ordinance makes no mention of towers, antennas or reasonable accommodations.
42.

43. The Ordinance is not in compliance with PRB-1 and is therefore out of compliance with
44. UCA 10-9a-515 and may not be enforced.
45.
46. Plaintiff is asking for the removal of items from which Defendant intends to
47.
48. construct an Amateur Radio Tower.
49.
50. Plaintiff has/tlone this without any in person contact or permission.
51.
52. Plaintiff has trespassed upon Defendant property.
53.
54. Defendant moves for dismissal with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant asks the court to grant his Motion To Dismiss.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2008.

Karl Peterson
Certificate of Delivery
I hereby certify that I deposited a true and correct copy of the forgoing Response with the Court
and in the box of the Plaintiff at the courthouse on this 25th day of July, 2008

Karl Peterson

Karl G. Peterson
70 West 400 North
American Fork, Utah 84003

FILFO IN

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAHM&Nf? A 8'- 33
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAflj ,- r"TAH
UFAHCOUMTY
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

©

)
1 Motion to Set Aside The Judgment
)

vs.

)) Case No. 081100531

KARL G. PETERSON
70 West 400 North
American Fork, UT 84003

]) Judge Howard H. Maetani
;
]

DOB: 07-26-59
Defendant

Comes now the Defendant and alleges*
1. The Pretrial conference was truncated when the defendant announced his intent to Move for
Dismissal. vlv K * *
2. A pretrial conference was not actually preformed by order of the Court.
3. No witness list was furnished to Defendant by Prosecution prior to the trial.
4. These factors constitute a breach of due process.
Wherefore, Defendant moves that the Judgment be set aside, or vacated, and that a Pretrial Conference
be scheduled.
Submitted to the Court this 17th day of December, 2008

Karl Peterson

8,08.010—8.08.030

Chapter 8.08
NUISANCE ABATEMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION
SectionsJ
8.08.010
8.08.020
8.08.030
8.08.040
8.08.050
8.08.060
8.08.070

Purpose.
Civil and criminal remedies.
Prohibited conduct—Definition of nuisance.
Inspection and administration.
Notice to property owners.
Failure to comply—Removal of nuisance.
Criminal penalty.

8.08.010 Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter
to establish a means whereby the city may designate and regulate the abatement of injurious and noxious weeds, garbage,
refuse or any unsightly or deleterious objects of structures, and to establish a means whereby the city may prosecute the violation of this chapter as a criminal offense,
pursuant to the powers granted to the city by Chapter 11 of
Title 10 and Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-61, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. (Ord. 86-05-09 SKpart), 1986)
8.08.020 Civil and criminal remedies. The city may
enforce this chapter by using the abatement procedure set
forth herein, by charging the violator with a criminal offense, or by both. The civil and criminal remedies provided
herein are not mutually exclusive. The city may elect to
deal with violators civilly, criminally, or both civilly and
criminally. (Ord. 86-05-09 §l(part), 1986)
8.08.030 Prohibited conduct—Definition of nuisance.
Without limiting the general application of this chapter,
the following conduct shall be considered a nuisance, and
may be abated as set forth herein, prosecuted criminally, or
both:
A. Noxious Weeds# Garbage, Refuse and Unsightly or
Deleterious Objects. It is unlawful, and shall be considered a nuisance, for any owner or occupant of real property located within the city limits to allow the accumulation or growth of noxious weeds, garbage, refuse, or any
unsightly of deleterious objects, conditions/ or structures
on such property, when such objects, conditions or structures create a fire hazard/ a source of contamination or
pollution of water, air or property, a danger to health, a
breeding ground or habitation for insects or rodents or other forms of life deleterious to human habitation, or when
such objects, conditions/ or structures are unsightly or
deleterious to their surroundings.
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8.08.040--8.08.050

B. Abandoned, Wrecked or Junk Vehicles. It is
unlawful, and shall be considered a nuisance, for any owner
or occupant of real property located within the city limits, to park, store or leave, or to permit the parking,
storing or leaving of any licensed or unlicensed motor
vehicle of any kind, or parts thereof, which is in a
wrecked, junked, partially dismantled, inoperative or abandoned condition, whether attended or not, upon such property, for a period of time in excess of seventy-two hours,
except that two or less such vehicles or parts thereof may
be stored if within a building, or placed behind an opaque
screening fence; and except that such vehicles and parts
may be within a junkyard or automobile wrecking yard lawfully established under the ordinances and laws of the
city; provided that such methods of storage do not violate
any other city ordinances or regulations. Any vehicles
accumulated in violation of the terms of this subparagraph
shall be considered to be an unsightly or deleterious object or structure for which the city may seek the civil
and/or criminal remedies set forth in this chapter.
C. Waste Material Accumulation. It is unlawful, and
shall be considered a nuisance, for any owner or occupant
of real property located within the city limits, to cause
or permit junk, scrap metal, scrap lumber, waste paper
products, discarded building materials, or any unused or
abandoned machinery or machinery parts, or other waste
materials, to be in or upon any such property unless in
connection with a business enterprise lawfully situated and
licensed for the same. Any waste material accumulated in
violation of the terms of this subsection shall be considered to be an unsightly or deleterious object, condition or
structure for which the city may seek the civil and/or
criminal remedies set forth in this chapter.
D. Definition of Unsightly. Whenever the term "unsightly" is used in this chapter, it shall mean ugly, displeasing or revolting to the sight. (Ord. 86-05-09
§l(part), 1986)
8.08.040 Inspection and administration. The mayor
may appoint one or more individuals to serve as city inspectors, also known as "enforcement officers," who shall
be and hereby are empowered to enforce and carry out the
provisions of this chapter. Additionally, for purposes
herein, the phrase "city inspector" shall include, by virtue of their office or law enforcement responsibilities,
the fire chief, fire marshal, zoning administrator, and any
and all building inspectors and police officers of the
city. (Ord. 98-09-41 §1, 1998: Ord. 86-05-09 §l(part),
1986)
8.08.050 Notice to property owners. The city inspector is authorized and directed to make careful examination
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8.08.050

and investigation of real property located within the
corporate limits of the city, for the growth and spread of
injurious and noxious weeds, and for the existence of garbage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious objects or structures. The city inspector shall ascertain the names of the
owners and occupants of the premises, as well as the description of the premises where such weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or
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structures exist, and shall serve notice in writing upon the
owner and occupant of such land, either personally or by
mailing notice, postage prepaid, addressed to the owner at
the last known post office address as disclosed by the records of the county assessor, and to the occupant at the address of the subject property, requiring such owner or occupant, as the case may be, to eradicate, or destroy and remove, the same within such time as the inspector may designate, which shall not be less than ten days from the date of
service of such notice. One notice shall be deemed sufficient on any lot or parcel of property for the entire season
of weed growth during that calendar year. The inspector
shall make proof of service of such notice under oath, and
file the same in the office of the county treasurer. (Ord.
86-05-09 Sl(part), 1986)
8.08.060 Failure to comply—Removal of nuisance. If
any owner or occupant of lands described in such notice
shall fail or neglect to eradicate, or destroy and remove,
such weeds, garbage, refuse, object or structure upon the
premises in accordance with such notice, it shall be the duty of the inspector, at the expense of the city, to employ
necessary assistance and cause such weeds, garbage, refuse,
objects or structures to be removed or destroyed. The inspector shall prepare an itemized statement of all expenses
incurred in the removal and destruction of same and shall
mail a copy thereof to the owner, demanding payment within
twenty days of the date of mailing. The notice shall be
deemed delivered when mailed by registered mail addressed to
the property owner's last known address. In the event the
owner fails to make payment of the amount set forth in the
statement to the city treasurer within the twenty days, the
inspector, on behalf of the city, may cause suit to be
brought in an appropriate court of law or may refer the matter to the county treasurer as hereinafter provided. In the
event collections of the costs are pursued through the
courts, the city may sue for and receive judgment upon all
of the costs of removal and destruction together with reasonable attorney's fees, interest and court costs. The city
may execute on such judgment in the manner provided by law.
In the event that the inspector elects to refer the matter
to the county treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of
the property owner, he shall make, in triplicate, an
itemized statement of all expenses incurred in the removal
and destruction of the same and shall deliver the three
copies of the statement to the county treasurer within ten
days after the completion of the work of removing such
weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures. If the city
inspector refers the matter to the county treasurer, the
county treasurer shall pursue the collection of the cost of
the work performed in accordance with the provisions of
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Chapter 10, Title 11, Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, as amended,
and the recalcitrant owner shall have such rights and shall
be subject to such powers as are thereby granted. (Ord.
86-05-09 Sl(part), 1986)
8,08.070 Criminal penalty,, Any person violating any
of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a class
B misdemeanor. (Ord. 86-05-09 §l(part), 1986)
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